There is Always a First Time: Coordinated Effects via Vertical Structural Changes in Anglo/Lafarge
Julie Bon, Pietro Crocioni, Francesca Sala, Dec 20, 2013
This article explores the UK Competition Commission’s Anglo/Lafarge merger decision (2012) focusing on the reasoning for a finding of coordinated effects in cement. While the theory of harm identified has been considered in a few theoretical academic papers and mentioned in the European Commission’s Guidelines on Non-Horizontal Mergers (2008), to our knowledge this was the first SLC finding in Europe based on coordinated effect in which the vertical aspect of the merger was a critical component of the decision.
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