Nov 05, 2010
In their thoughtful article, Douglas Ginsburg and Joshua Wright make five key points towards enhancing cartel deterrence through increased penalties: Collusion is under-deterred and there is little risk of over-deterrence; Corporate penalties cannot be raised to a level sufficient to deter collusion; Individual penalties should be used more aggressively, with an emphasis on debarment; Corporate penalties should not be increased; and Corporate penalties should not be assessed when a company was not negligent. This discussion considers each of these points and then concludes with some additional suggestions.
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