Peter Carstensen, Dec 20, 2012
This article examines the unavoidable adverse effects on consumer choice, consumer prices, and competition in the market for the tied (as well as the tying good) that necessarily result from unjustified tying by any firm with any appreciable capacity to affect competition in the markets for either good. My thesis is not that all tying is or should be absolutely illegal, but rather it ought to remain presumptively illegal and should be condemned after only a “quick look” unless the defendant can plead and prove a legitimate justification, i.e., one that does not involve primarily exploiting customers or excluding competitors.
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