OCC Flags Extra Payment Checks as AI Aids Impersonators

Highlights

Sixty-one percent of surveyed firms reserve real-time identity checks for high-value or high-risk payments.

Forty-three percent of scam victims made or authorized a payment within an hour of first contact.

Fifty-five percent of victims cut back on answering unfamiliar calls after a scam.

A change in a supplier’s bank account gives the sending bank two things to verify before releasing payment. One is whether the name on the new account matches the intended payee. The other is whether the supplier actually requested the change.

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    The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s Nov. 12 “Semiannual Risk Perspective, Fall 2026” says artificial intelligence gives criminals the means to carry out impersonation, social engineering and account takeover “with greater speed, scale, and complexity.” Among the controls the OCC cites are human review and “using a different communication method from the one used in the request.” The report also points to monitoring for unusually rapid or frequent activity, including login attempts, password resets and transactions.

    Businesses in payment-heavy industries already make choices about where to apply some of those safeguards. In the August “Payment Protection” report, PYMNTS Intelligence and Plaid found that 61% of surveyed firms limited real-time identity verification signals to high-value or high-risk transactions. Nineteen percent used them for all or nearly all payments. The survey of 150 senior executives covered seven industries and measured the use of signals such as device and behavioral data.

    The same survey found that 65% used secure bank connections to confirm account ownership in real time. Among firms that verified ownership in real time, 21% said they detected fraud before funds moved, compared with 10% of firms that did without real-time ownership checks.

    When a Payment Warrants a Callback

    Federal Reserve Financial Services launched a fraud mitigation resource center Nov. 9 that highlights pre-payment screening. Its existing Payee Name Verification service lets eligible institutions compare an intended payee’s name with the account and routing details before issuing payment. In a separate illustration from Federal Reserve Financial Services, a bank reviewing an unusually large wire spots a change in the payment details, gets a name mismatch from the receiving bank, and holds the wire while it contacts its own customer.

    Who makes that call depends on who received the instruction. A bank with a suspicious wire can reach its corporate customer through an established contact. The customer’s treasury team can then confirm a change with the supplier using the number already in its records. Nacha’s October guidance for corporate payment teams identifies supplier account changes and urgent requests attributed to executives as examples of impersonation and points to trusted channels and additional approvals for unusual transactions.

    Those checks also have costs that can be measured across staff time and effort. In September’s “Prevention First” report, based on responses from 150 U.S. treasury and finance executives, PYMNTS Intelligence and Bottomline found that 89% regarded supplier checks as a burden. At the same time, 81% planned to strengthen supplier checks and 75% planned stronger bank account checks.

    On the consumer side, the September “Fraud’s Loyalty Tax” study, drawn from a July survey of 9,524 U.S. consumers, found that 43% of scam victims made or authorized a payment within an hour of first contact. That interval begins when the scammer reaches the victim, so the bank’s opportunity to intervene begins later if the payment instruction is its first indication of trouble. The same study found that 55% of victims cut back on answering unfamiliar calls after a scam, which makes the means of reaching a customer part of the verification decision. A notice inside the bank’s app gives the customer a familiar place to respond.

    A callback can establish that the customer submitted the instruction. In an impersonation scam, the customer may sincerely believe it is legitimate. A conversation about who requested the payment or why the destination changed gives the bank more to work with than a second yes to the same transfer. On a supplier payment, that additional inquiry may spur the treasury team back to the supplier before the bank releases the funds.