November 05, 2010
Constant Vigilance: Maintaining Cartel Deterrence During the Great Recession
Margaret Levenstein, Valerie Suslow, Nov 05, 2010 Antitrust authorities around the world have continued to pursue illegal price-fixing throughout the economic crisis, but have also increasingly granted “inability to pay”...
November 05, 2010
Screens for Conspiracies and Their Multiple Applications
Rosa Abrantes-Metz, Patrick Bajari, Nov 05, 2010 A screen is a statistical test designed to detect conspiracies aimed at illegally manipulating a market. Competition authorities, academics, and consultants have designed...
November 05, 2010
Recidivism Revealed: Private International Cartels 1990-2009
John M. Connor, Nov 05, 2010 The objective of this paper is to look for empirical regularities in the sample of 389 recidivists that engaged in international price-fixing in the...
November 05, 2010
Antitrust Criminal Sanctions: The Evolution of Executive Punishment
Donald Klawiter, Nov 05, 2010 Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg and Professor Joshua D. Wright’s excellent study of antitrust sanctions for corporations and individuals concludes with a strong recommendation that individual...
November 05, 2010
Improving Deterrence of Hard-Core Cartels
Mariana Tavares de Araujo, Nov 05, 2010 The purpose of this paper is to discuss Ginsburg’s & Wright’s proposal to enhance deterrence of hard-core cartels by shifting sanctions away from...
November 05, 2010
Antitrust Oversight: More an Art than a Craft
Pieter Kalbfleisch, Nov 05, 2010 Would it lead to more effective sanctioning of cartel violations if attention were shifted from sanctioning undertakings to primarily sanctioning those individuals who, de facto,...
November 05, 2010
Comment on Antitrust Sanctions
Nov 05, 2010 In their thoughtful article, Douglas Ginsburg and Joshua Wright make five key points towards enhancing cartel deterrence through increased penalties: Collusion is under-deterred and there is little...
November 05, 2010
Antitrust Sanctions
Douglas Ginsburg, Joshua Wright, Nov 05, 2010 In this article, we first discuss traditional deterrence theory as applied to optimal criminal antitrust penalties. Then we evaluate both the U.S. and...
November 05, 2010
Letter From the Editor
Antitrust authorities have pursued cartels with steadily increasing vigor over the last three decades. Guided in significant part by economics and game theory, authorities have both ratcheted up fines to...